<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schedule>
<version>2.0</version>

<conference>
<acronym>Pass the SALT</acronym>
<title>Pass the SALT 2018</title>
<start>2018-07-02</start>
<end>2018-07-04</end>
<days>3</days>
<timeslot_duration>00:10</timeslot_duration>
</conference>

<day date="2018-07-02" end="2018-07-02T17:50:00+02:00" index="1" start="2018-07-02T14:00:00+02:00">

<room name="Amphi MIGEON">

<event guid="1" id="1">
<date>2018-07-02T14:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:00</start>
<stop>14:15</stop>
<duration>00:15</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**Launching talk**</title>
<subtitle/>
<track>Misc</track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>General informations about the conference
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://conf.qtcon.org/assets/qtcon.jpg</logo>
<persons>
	<person>The organization team</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="2" id="2">
<date>2018-07-02T14:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:15</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<slug>1</slug>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Debian security team: behind the curtains</title>
<subtitle/>
<track>Linux Distribution Security</track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>This talk will presents the Debian security team: the people, the roles, the workflows. It will also detail the handling of vulnerabilities, both public and private/embargoed ones. 
</abstract>
<description>
</description>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
<person>Yves-Alexis Perez - Debian developer, member of the security team. He works at ANSSI as head of the Hardware and Software architecture lab.</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="3" id="3">
<date>2018-07-02T14:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:50</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>r2frida - Better Together</title>
<subtitle/>
<track>Reverse and low level</track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
In this talk we will present Frida and Radare as separate and combined tools. Have you ever wanted to enhance your static analysis with live telemetry from a running instance of the software that you’re analyzing? Did you ever want a more visual interface for Frida to type commands instead of snippets of JavaScript? If any of the above, or none of it, then this talk is for you. 
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
<person>Ole André V. Ravnås - Frida developer</person>
‎<person>Sergi Alvarez aka pancake - r2 developer</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="4" id="4">
<date>2018-07-02T15:25:00+02:00</date>
<start>15:25</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Static instrumentation based on executable file formats</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>Many instrumentation techniques are based on modifying code or system environment of the target. It can be suitable for scenarios but it could not work under certain circumstance (integrity checking, non-rooted environment…) In this talk we propose similar techniques by only modifying the executable format. This enables to be architecture independent, injection and hooking does not require privileged environment. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
<person>Romain Thomas (LIEF developer, Quarkslab)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="5" id="5">
<date>2018-07-02T16:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>16:00</start>
<stop>16:20</stop>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**Afternoon Break**</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="6" id="6">
<date>2018-07-02T16:20:00+02:00</date>
<start>16:20</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Machine-Code Analysis With Open-Source Decompiler RetDec</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>When we need to deeply analyze a binary application (e.g. for malware dissection, vulnerability research, code optimization), static code analysis is what we use most of the time. However, static analysis of machine-code is usually not an easy task. It is actually a tough one in case of malware analysis. Luckily, existing machine-code decompilers help with this task significantly. On the other hand, the most well-known decompilers are either proprietary, cannot be easily modified for a given task, or both. In this talk, we would like to depict our machine-code decompiler called RetDec (Retargetable Decompiler) that we are developing in Avast since 2011 and which we have open-sourced a few months ago under the MIT license. Its primary goal is, of course, decompilation of binary (malicious) applications, but its components can also be used for other tasks, such as disassembly, extraction of basic blocks, or initial assessment of malware samples.</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Jakub Kroustek  (RetDec creator, Avast software)</person>
    <person>Peter Matula (RetDec developer, Avast software)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="7" id="7">
<date>2018-07-02T16:55:00+02:00</date>
<start>16:55</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Are there Spectre-based malware on your Android smartphone?</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>The Spectre attack has had massive coverage, and I assume (nearly) everybody at Pass The Salt will have heard of it. This talk is not yet another explanation of Spectre, nor generic advice of what to do. Rather, this talk is oriented on implementation issues and answering 2 simple questions (which haven’t been addressed yet to my knowledge): 1. Is your Android smartphone vulnerable to Spectre or not? ARM has published a security advisory with a list of vulnerable processors. We’ll see that the answer isn’t as simple as checking the list. . . 2. How can we detect malware using Spectre, and are there any? The media have been quiet about that. Working for an AV company, that’s perhaps something I can contribute to. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Axelle Apvrille (Senior researcher, Fortinet)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="8" id="8">
<date>2018-07-02T17:30:00+02:00</date>
<start>17:30</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>A graphical user interface for radare2: Cutter</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>Radare2 is a free and open-source reverse engineering framework, which is becoming more and more popular. One of its main criticisms is that it is only usable within a terminal (CLI), and that the commands are not intuitive, making the learning curve steep. The Cutter project was created to provide an easy-to-use, but still powerful, interface to radare2 for new users. This is done with a native graphical user interface made in Qt and C++. The goal of the talk is to present radare2 history, along with the common complaints from users, and how we try to overcome those with Cutter. I’ll be presenting the features that are already implemented, the way we allow our users to script the interface, and obviously the missing features that we will implement in a near future. While Cutter is still under heavy development, it’s becoming more and more user-friendly and easy to use. It is becoming a great alternative to other reverse engineering tools. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Antide Petit (Cutter developer)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

</room>

<room name="B001 : D'Arsonval">

<event guid="10" id="10">
<date>2018-07-02T14:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:15</start>
<duration>02:30</duration>
<room>B001 : D'Arsonval</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>WORKSHOP: Introduction to Bro Network Security Monitor</title>
<subtitle/>
<track>Workshop</track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
Bro is an open-source Network Security Monitor (NSM) and analytics platform. Even though it has been around since the mid 90’s, its main user base was primarily universities, research labs and supercomputing centers. In the past few years however, more and more security professionals in the industry turned their attention to this powerful tool, as it runs on commodity hardware, thus providing a low-cost alternative to commercial solutions.

At its core, Bro inspects traffic and creates an extensive set of well-structured, tab-separated log files that record a network’s activity. Nonetheless, Bro is a lot more than just a traditional signature-based IDS. While it supports such standard functionality as well, Bro’s scripting language allows security analysts to perform arbitrary analysis tasks such as extracting files from sessions, detecting malware by interfacing with an external source, detecting brute-forcing, etc. It comes with a large set of pre-built standard libraries, just like Python.

During this two-hour workshop, we will learn about Bro’s capabilities and cover the following topics:

    Introduction to Bro
    Bro architecture
    Bro events and logs
    Bro signatures
    Bro scripting
    Bro and ELK

Requirements for the workshop:

    A laptop with at least 8 GB of RAM and more than 30 GB of free disk space
    VMWare Workstation or VMWare Player installed
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
<person>Eva Szilagyi - CEO Alzette Information Security</person>
<person>David Szili - CTO Alzette Information Security</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

</room>

</day>

<day date="2018-07-03" end="2018-07-03T17:55:00+02:00" index="1" start="2018-07-03T09:00:00+02:00">

<room name="Amphi MIGEON">

<event guid="11" id="11">
<date>2018-07-03T09:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>09:00</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Traffic filtering at scale on Linux</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>BPF programs are widely known for packet filtering in libpcap (the underlying capture library used by tcpdump and wireshark). One can also use them for performance analysis (perf uses BPF programs), but also for security purposes (seccomp uses BPF as well). In this talk, we focus on networking and dive into BPF bytecode. First, we will have a look on the available toolchains and API. Then we will jump into actual BPF programs and figure how eBPF can be leveraged to perform traffic filtering using several mechanism amongst socket filtering API, iptables and tc. Finally, we will scratch the surface of XDP capabilities.</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>François Serman (OVH)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="12" id="12">
<date>2018-07-03T09:35:00+02:00</date>
<start>09:35</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Performance with a S like Security: the eBPF XDP case </title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) and eXtreme Data Path (XDP) technologies are gaining in popularity in the tracing and performance community in Linux for eBPF and among the networking people for XDP. After an introduction to these technologies, this talk proposes to get a look to the usage of the eBPF and XDP technology in the domain of security. A special focus on Suricata that uses this technology to enhance its performance and by consequences the accuracy of its network analysis and detection.</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Éric Leblond (Suricata core developer, Stamus Networks)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="13" id="13">
<date>2018-07-03T10:10:00+02:00</date>
<start>10:10</start>
<stop>10:30</stop>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**Morning Pause**</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="14" id="14">
<date>2018-07-03T10:30:00+02:00</date>
<start>10:30</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>KEYNOTE: a 10 years journey in Linux firewalling</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>Just come :) </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Pablo Neira Ayuso (Head of Netfilter core team)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="15" id="15">
<date>2018-07-03T11:05:00+02:00</date>
<start>11:05</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Full packet capture for the masses</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>When you are facing a security incident, your investigations will depend on the data that you can analyze. If logs are often the first source of evidence, sometimes, it could be interesting to have access to a full packet capture to “dive deeper” in the traffic generated from/to the compromised network or host. Full packet capture (FPC) is like your insurance, you implement it and you never know if you’ll have to use it… Until something weird happened! In my presentation, I’ll present a simple way to implement FPC for small organizations and based on open source solutions (Moloch, Docker) and how to interconnect them. This talk is an extension of my SANS ISC diary (The easy way to analyze huge amounts of PCAP data) with more practical details. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Xavier Mertens (Security consultant, ISC SANS handler)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="16" id="16">
<date>2018-07-03T11:40:00+02:00</date>
<start>11:40</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Rumps Session</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>This is a session of lightning talks (between 3-5min).You will be able to register to give a lightning talk a few days before the event until Monday 2nd July evening.
Only one requirement: your talk has to be about Free Software and Security.</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>You!</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="17" id="17">
<date>2018-07-03T12:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>12:15</start>
<stop>14:15</stop>
<duration>02:00</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**Mid Day Break**</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="18" id="18">
<date>2018-07-03T14:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:15</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Security and Self-Driving Computers</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>We have to admit to ourselves: we do not really like to turn on automatic updates. We do not like relinquishing control. Even if we do not really know what the announced update contains, we like to have one look at it before we hit the “update” button.
Right?
Often, still, we do not even have an automated update option available - like on our phones. And we are nagged every other month or so that an update is available, that we should install it and if we please can hit the “ok” button now to start it.
My mother usually calls me when her phone asks her to update. “Should I?” she asks. And I always say “Yes!” And she keeps on calling me.
Well, that’s what mothers do anyway. But you get the point.
This is technical nonsense. It’s all part of the Legal Blame Game: “Make sure, when things go wrong, we have an excuse.” But from a technical and security point of view, updates need to happen without user intervention, for everyone.
For our security infrastructure, we try to avoid this and jump from “no updates” to full automation. Because expired certificates are just too embarrassing for everyone.
Oh, and we can make it free at the same time - because automation.
[Insert the story of Let’s Encrypt (LE) that everyone knows…]
LE is interested to get broad support, so one of the most commonly used web server on the planet was a natural target. greenbytes proposed to MOSS (Mozilla’s Open Source Support) for a grant and got it going in 2017.
This talk gives a summary of what is nowadays available in Apache, what is still on the road ahead, and where one may contribute (Hint: ACME fuzzing anyone?)!
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Stefan Eissing (Mod_md developer (Let’s Encrypt Apache module))</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="19" id="19">
<date>2018-07-03T14:50:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:50</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Snuffleupagus: killing bug classes and virtual patching the rest</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Julien Voisin, Thibault Koechlin, Simon Magnin-Feysot (Snuffleupagus developers, NBS Systems)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="20" id="20">
<date>2018-07-03T15:25:00+02:00</date>
<start>15:25</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Preview of Vulture’s upcoming web filtering engine</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>We are the creators of the VultureProject, an Open Source HTTP reverse-proxy that ensures the security of web applications. Built on top of open-source technologies such as Apache, FreeBSD, HA-Proxy and MongoDB, Vulture’s basic features are: network firewall, TCP and HTTP proxy balancing, user authentication, web application firewall, TLS endpoint, content rewriting and many other cool things. Currently based on ModSecurity, ModDefender and custom algorithms (including machine learning), the VultureProject Team wants to push innovation even further by creating an all new, fully modular, standalone and open-source intelligent web application firewall engine. No longer based on rules, this engine will be able to understand, dissect and analyze with a lot of finesse every request and response sent; you will no longer need to spend hours of configuration, simply activate the filters you need and let our algorithms learn by themselves and protect your web applications. During the talk, we will focus on this new WAF (Web Application Firewall) engine, explaining why we need to rethink web applications security today, how we are conceiving this new solution, how we are building it and how we think it will solve some issues faced daily by our teams and by our community. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Jérémie Jourdin and Hugo Soszynski (Vulture developers, aDvens)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="21" id="21">
<date>2018-07-03T15:45:00+02:00</date>
<start>15:45</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**CANCELLED** SecureDrop, for whistle-blowers</title>
<subtitle/>SecureDrop, for whistle-blowers
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>This session will introduce SecureDrop, a Free Software whistleblowing platform which received the 2016 Free Software Award from the Free Software Foundation for Social Benefits.

We will describe how it addresses the critical need for a way for journalists and sources to communicate securely and anonymously. Many large news organizations including the Associated Press (AP), the Guardian, the Washington Post and the New York Times are all now running SecureDrop in their newsrooms to preserve an anonymous tip line in the presence of increasing surveillance powers by governments and corporations.

We will describe how SecureDrop works, how sources/journalists should use it, and how you can contribute to the project. 
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>François Poulain (SecureDrop admin)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="21" id="21">
<date>2018-07-03T15:45:00+02:00</date>
<start>15:45</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>How-To clusterize malwares datasets with open source tools and data</title>
<subtitle/>How-To clusterize malwares datasets with open source tools and data
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
    <person>Sébastien Larinier, @sebdraven, independant security researcher</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="22" id="22">
<date>2018-07-03T16:05:00+02:00</date>
<start>16:05</start>
<stop>16:25</stop>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**Afternoon Break**</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="23" id="23">
<date>2018-07-03T16:25:00+02:00</date>
<start>16:25</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Second factor authentication (2FA) in LemonLDAP::NG</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>In LemonLDAP::NG 2.0, the second factor authentication is now a built-in feature and allows to rely on FIDO Alliance, TOTP, Yubikey, or any third party device through script call. I will first present how authentication works in LL::NG and how the 2FA was integrated as core functionality.</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Clément Oudot, Xavier Guimard (LemonLDAP::NG developers)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="24" id="24">
<date>2018-07-03T17:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>17:00</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>No way JOSE! Lessons for authors and implementers of open standards</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>Protocol and data format specifications can be ambiguous, insecure or have other problems. Programmers and users bear the brunt of these issues. Using JOSE as a case study, I’ll discuss mistakes for standards authors to avoid, and demonstrate programming techniques for mitigating some kinds of problems.

JOSE (JSON Object Signing and Encryption) is a set of IETF standards for JSON-based cryptographic objects. You might know it as JWT or JWS. It is used in OpenID Connect, ACME, and other protocols. JOSE emerged a few years ago and has been causing headaches for the presenter ever since.

Using JOSE as a case study, this presentation looks at mistakes to avoid when specifying a data format or cryptographic protocol. We’ll also explore programming techniques for mitigating some kinds of problems in specifications. In particular, we will cover:

    the flawed rationale for the JOSE working group
    why JSON is a poor wire format for cryptographic objects
    cryptography issues in the JOSE specifications
    ambiguities and interoperability problems in the specifications
    common vulnerabilities in JOSE libraries
    how library authors can encourage or enforce safe use
    advice for standards authors or working groups

Each topic will culminate in one simple, actionable takeaway.

Programming principles and techniques will be demonstrated using Haskell and its jose library, which is maintained by the presenter. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Fraser Tweedale (Software Engineer, Red Hat)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="25" id="25">
<date>2018-07-03T17:35:00+02:00</date>
<start>17:35</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Too bad… your password has just been stolen! Did you consider using 2FA?</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>Authentication is a major component of security, but is often implemented as a password-based solution even though stronger and more secure alternatives exist. This talk will explain the risks associated with password-based authentication, describe the advantages of two-factor authentication, and show how open source software such as FreeIPA can help deploy an infrastructure for Smart Card authentication with X509 certificates or One-Time Password authentication. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Florence Blanc-Renaud (Senior Software Engineer FreeIPA, Red Hat)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

</room>

<room name="B001 : D'Arsonval">

<event guid="26" id="26">
<date>2018-07-03T09:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>09:00</start>
<stop>12:00</stop>
<duration>03:00</duration>
<room>B001 : D'Arsonval</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>WORKSHOP AIL-Framework: A modular framework to analyse potential information leaks</title>
<subtitle/>
<track>Workshop</track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
AIL is an open source modular framework to analyse potential information leaks from unstructured data sources like pastes from Pastebin or similar services or unstructured data streams. The primary aim of the framework is to gather credentials, emails, creditcard numbers and so on in order to help security experts to detect leaks and then, react accordingly. Moreover, AIL framework is flexible and can be extended fairly easily to support other functionalities to mine sensitive information.

The AIL workshop will show how the framework functions, how to use it, how you can feed the software with your own data and finally how you can contributes to help us improve AIL with new features.

Requirements for the workshop:

a laptop with 8GB of RAM, 2 cores and VirtualBox installed.

</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
<person>Sami Mokaddem (CIRCL)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="27" id="27">
<date>2018-07-03T14:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:15</start>
<stop>16:10</stop>
<duration>02:00</duration>
<room>B001 : D'Arsonval</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>WORKSHOP: URL Analysis with Faup</title>
<subtitle/>
<track>Workshop</track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
Whenever one want to run an investigation over the URLs crawled from her/his organization website, it can get tricky: millions of URLs to follow, hard to keep control on what is going on. This presentation will focus on the open source tool called FAUP for Finally An URL Parser and show how it has been used with large organizations to quickly understand new threats. Faup helps with the snapshot mechanism to classify URLs to be used for Machine Learning, it gives an automatic way of creating a white list at scale to then only spend the time focusing on the URLs you are not aware of. Faup can be used similarly to Dshield and gather intelligence over URLs and will show how collaboration over something as simple as an URL in conjunction with MISP can enhance the discovery of unknown threats. 

</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
<person>Sébastien Tricaud (Open source and security pro and enthusiast, Splunk)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

</room>
</day>

<day date="2018-07-04" end="2018-07-04T17:40:00+02:00" index="1" start="2018-07-04T09:00:00+02:00">

<room name="Amphi MIGEON">

<event guid="28" id="28">
<date>2018-07-04T09:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>09:00</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Fail frequently to avoid disaster, or how to organically build an open threat intelligence sharing standard to keep the intelligence community free and sane!</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>Designing a successful standard for threat intel sharing is a daunting task, with a host of possible pitfalls. This talk aims to describe the journey, challenges and mistakes the MISP Project made while designing the MISP standard as we know it today. There are several paths that can lead to a well-defined standard: early and prolonged requirements gathering versus starting small with rapid iterations, democratic and centralised driving forces, inclusive and exclusive ideologies. Our weapon of choice was an implementation driven, rapid iterative and real-world usage centric approach using the PMF methodology, which allowed us to experiment and fail often but also be aware of our failures before they became irrevocable disasters.

The speakers will attempt to compare and contrast the various methodologies and what lessons we’ve learned. 
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Alexandre Dulaunoy, Andras Iklody (CIRCL)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="29" id="29">
<date>2018-07-04T09:35:00+02:00</date>
<start>09:35</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>The story of Greendale</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Thomas Chopitea (Forensics investigator and engineer, Google)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="30" id="30">
<date>2018-07-04T10:10:00+02:00</date>
<start>10:10</start>
<stop>10:30</stop>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**Morning Pause**</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="31" id="31">
<date>2018-07-04T10:30:00+02:00</date>
<start>10:30</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Internals of Landlock: a new kind of Linux Security Module leveraging eBPF</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>In this talk we explain the constraints and choices that led to the design of Landlock, a new Linux Security Module (LSM) proposal designed to let unprivileged users enforce their own security policy. Landlock has multiple new properties that can complete those of the current major LSMs (e.g. SELinux). Leveraging the eBPF engine, Landlock can apply multiple access controls and make them evolve over time, enabling developers to manage security policy per application instead of dealing with access-control rules defined for the whole system. We answer some questions such as: What are the constraints and good practices to properly extend the Linux kernel? How Landlock uses eBPF with the LSM framework? What are the required restrictions to express a security policy, with a bytecode like eBPF, in a safe way? We also show a new demo highlighting the dynamic aspect of Landlock.

This talk is intended to be a deep dive into some internals of Landlock. For a more general introduction to Landlock, you can get a look at https://landlock.io (FOSDEM 2018). </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Mickaël Salaün (Security researcher, ANSSI)
	</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="32" id="32">
<date>2018-07-04T:11:05+02:00</date>
<start>11:05</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Secure programming is slow - really?</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>Performance is important in many programs: web servers, network applications, intrusion detection systems, etc. In these programs, C is a usual choice as the programming language: it is close to the hardware, and very fast. However, it is very hard to make the program secure, and this results in many vulnerabilities.

This talk is about why and how use rust to achieve both performance and security by creating a “safe zone” in a C program. We first look at the good code patterns to produce efficient code, and the limits of this approach. We then go through the optimization of the code to gain more performance, and check that doing so we do not remove any important check.

We can use Kerberos as an example, since it is based on ASN.1/DER, which is both difficult to manipulate, and very error-prone: all objects are Type-Length-Value (TLV), so a C parser has to manipulate recursive objects with pointers and lengths everywhere. DER parsers are regular clients for CVEs.

Keywords: performance, security, rust, assembly

Note: we take the parsers in Suricata as an example of such code. However, this talk is not related to Suricata, but more about the source code, the compiler and the produced code. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Pierre Chifflier (Long time FLOSS developer, ANSSI)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="33" id="33">
<date>2018-07-04T11:40:00+02:00</date>
<start>11:40</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Immutable infrastructure and zero trust networking: designing your system for resilience</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>At Clever Cloud, we designed our hosting platform around the principles of immutable infrastructure, to allow easier application version management and rollout. But these principles also bring great benefits for the system’s security, by shortening persistence time, reducing the capacity to pivot, and allowing fast platform wide updates. We’ll study how the system is designed to handle immutable infrastructure’s needs, and see how it reacts to common threats.</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Geoffroy Couprie (Security researcher and developer, Clever Cloud)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="34" id="34">
<date>2018-07-04T12:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>12:15</start>
<stop>14:15</stop>
<duration>02:00</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**Mid Day Break**</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="35" id="35">
<date>2018-07-04T14:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:15</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>IoT Honeypot, new types of attacks</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>This presentation will share to the audience the status of IOT attacks from a worldwide distributed honeypot point of view. What are the different protocols, their exposure to the internet and how they are being actively exploited (Modbus, IPMI, S7, Bacnet, Telnet, SNMP etc.)? We have created a Gas Station simulation, no later than 3 hours after having the server on the internet, we started to monitor communications towards a fake S7 service (our Siemens PLC: Siemens SIMATIC S7-200). We are using free software only and this talk wants to boost the audience with the understanding of those technologies and share experience on how to write such a type of honeypot, and hopefully have more ideas to improve the security of a domain that is at least 15 years late! </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Sébastien Tricaud (Open source and security pro and enthusiast, Splunk)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="36" id="36">
<date>2018-07-04T14:50:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:50</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Io(M)T Security: A year in review</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>A year ago, I embarked on the funky journey to gain insights into IoT security. I am particularly interested in medical devices, that is an item that’s connected to the Internet AND can gather some sort of health data.

I started off with connected sex toys—it’s fun to tear them down, then tell others about it. Beyond the fun, though, is the actual understanding of what is at stake. And, in all honesty, your fridge, your insulin pump and your pacemaker all share the same challenges: they need improved security so that we are not at risk.

Since the first dildo I investigated, my analysis capabilities have evolved. This talk will address the diverse range of challenges I have had: obtaining the objects (the least complex one… but not the cheapest option, still!), producing reproducible data, collecting meaningful logs, having the companies building the IoT fix their flaws, etc. Thankfully, I will also discuss the solutions I identified, all of which involve FLOSS and (in part) open hardware.</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Rayna Stamboliyska (Risk management and crisis mitigation expert)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="37" id="37">
<date>2018-07-04T15:25:00+02:00</date>
<start>15:25</start>
<duration>00:35</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Expl-iot: IoT Security Testing Framework</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>After working on IoT security testing for a few years, we realized that there is a lot of time spent on learning and setting up different tools including hardware, radio and software. As the IoT technology is new there is no standard software to test most of the components and the tools available are either not mature yet or do only specific job. With this problem at hand we envisioned a software that would allow developers and researchers to automate most of the IoT security testing steps. We began our journey with writing a flexible and extendable framework that would help the community and us in writing quick IoT test cases and exploits. The objectives of the framework are:

- Easy of use
- Extendable
- Support for hardware, radio and IoT protocol analysis

We released the beta version (in ruby) of Expl-iot in 2017. Once we started implementing hardware and radio functionality, we realized that ruby does not have much support for hardware and radio analysis which led us to deprecate it and re-write it in python to support more functionality. We are currently working on the python3 version and will release it in a month or two. The new beta release is envisioned to have support for UART(serial), ZigBee, BLE, MQTT, CoAP (next version will have support for JTAG, I2C and SPI) and few miscellaneous test cases. This talk would give attendees a first-hand view of the functionality, how to use it and how to write plugins to extend the framework. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Aseem Jakhar (Research and Development director and open source developer, Payatu software lab)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="38" id="38">
<date>2018-07-04T16:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>16:00</start>
<stop>16:20</stop>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>**Afternoon Break**</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="39" id="39">
<date>2018-07-04T16:20:00+02:00</date>
<start>16:20</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Freedom Fighting Mode - Open Source Hacking Harness</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>The concept of “hacking harnesses” was introduced by thegrugq at HITB Kuala Lumpur 2007 (pdf). Ever since, the subject has received virtually no attention and no such tool has been released publicly. Worse, the code that had been made available at the time is no longer online and was lost by its author. The goal of harnesses is to provide a hacking environment where security professionals can focus on red teaming activities without having to fight against their terminal to perform simple actions (such as uploading or downloading files, and executing remote commands in memory). FFM is a Python framework which was developed to fill this void. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Ivan Kwiatkowski (Pentester and malware analyst) </person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="40" id="40">
<date>2018-07-04T09:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>16:40</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Open Hardware for (software) offensive security</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>This talk is about using the possibilities given by open hardware during penetration testing. Indeed, open hardware offers new tools for hardware and software penetration testing. The presentation will focus on software hacking.

After a brief introduction of my favorite toys and a small review of hardware penetration testing from open hardware, the talk will describe different use cases (Wi-Fi, laptop/desktop/smartphone, internal penetration testing…) where open hardware offers: new possibilities, automation or discretion.

As this is about (open) hardware, there are always limitations, issues, etc. This talk will also offer the opportunity to share and discuss them (as well as a few solutions and calls for contribution/help).</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Antoine Cervoise (IT security engineer, NTT Security)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="41" id="41">
<date>2018-07-04T17:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>17:00</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Shadow on the Wall - Risks and Flaws with Shadowsocks</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>What is one of the cornerstones of the Internet? Right! Being able to access all kinds of information, without censorship. In some countries this is no longer possible, and this is why technologies such as Tor and Shadowsocks are needed.

While the main feature of Tor is the onion routing and the aim of being cryptographically secure, it can easily be blocked by a firewall.

Shadowsocks simply tries to provide an undetectable tunnel to a non-censored part of the Internet.

Shadowsocks provides a Socks5proxy locally, into which all traffic is routed. It encrypts traffic with a configurable symmetric algorithm and the messages have (pseudo) random lengths. The absence of any visible protocol information makes them appear totally random. The goal is stealth through restricted infrastructures.

Naturally, users of such tools may be exposed to increased risks. Therefore the tools aim to be undetectable by deep packet inspection firewalls. For security and privacy they have to encrypt the traffic, use random padding, ensure integrity, and should imitate other protocols so as to look like normal encrypted traffic, e.g. such as that from an encrypted website. The server should be authenticated to ensure that the user does not communicate with a malicious endpoint.

We had a look at Shadowsocks to see how it handles this task, and noticed some interesting things.

This talk shows the results of our efforts to analyse ShadowSocks and identifying real vulnerabilities. There were attempts about detecting shadowsocks. We show how to brute force it, manipulate its log files. In addition, we will show several local as well as remote command execution vulnerabilities affecting shadowsocks and its tools. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Niklas Abel (Pentester and security auditor, X41)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="42" id="42">
<date>2018-07-04T17:20:00+02:00</date>
<start>17:20</start>
<duration>00:20</duration>
<room>Amphi MIGEON</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>Glassfish from (IN)Secure admin</title>
<subtitle/>
<track></track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>A talk presenting a way to bypass the “secure admin” feature of Glassfish to access the administration panel and deploy your own webshell. </abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
	<person>Jérémy Mousset (Pentester)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

</room>

<room name="B001 : D'Arsonval">

<event guid="43" id="43">
<date>2018-07-03T09:00:00+02:00</date>
<start>09:00</start>
<stop>11:00</stop>
<duration>02:00</duration>
<room>B001 : D'Arsonval</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>WORKSHOP FreeIPA: Open Source Identity Management</title>
<subtitle/>
<track>Workshop</track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>
In this workshop, participants will learn about FreeIPA and get hands-on experience installing and managing FreeIPA servers, clients, users and policies.

FreeIPA is an integrated identity management solution providing centralised user, host and service management, authentication and authorisation in Linux/UNIX networked environments, with a focus on ease of deployment and management. It is built on top of well-known Open Source technologies and standards including 389 Directory Server, MIT Kerberos and Dogtag Certificate System.

Organisations use FreeIPA to provide centralised management of identities and security policies. By avoiding identity silos, security goals can be achieved with reduced effort and improved auditability.

This session will begin with a short presentation providing an overview of FreeIPA’s capabilities and architecture. The rest of the session is devoted to the practical workshop curriculum. Participants will:

    Install a FreeIPA server and replica and enrol a client machine
    Create and administer users
    Manage host-based access control (HBAC) policies
    Issue TLS certificates for network services
    Configure a web server to use FreeIPA for user authentication and access control

There are some elective units participants can choose from, based on their progress and interests:

    OTP two-factor authentication
    Advanced certificate management: profiles, sub-CAs and user certificates
    OpenSSH key management
    Sudo rule administration
    SELinux user maps
    …and more!

Requirements:
To get the most out of the workshop, participants should complete the preparation steps beforehand: https://github.com/freeipa/freeipa-workshop#preparation

Project URL: http://www.freeipa.org/
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
<person>Florence Renaud (Senior Software Engineer FreeIPA, Red Hat) and Fraser Tweedale (Software Engineer, Red Hat)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

<event guid="44" id="44">
<date>2018-07-04T14:15:00+02:00</date>
<start>14:15</start>
<stop>17:15</stop>
<duration>03:00</duration>
<room>B001 : D'Arsonval</room>
<recording>
<license>Creative Commons by SA</license>
<optout>false</optout>
</recording>
<title>WORKSHOP Suricata and SELKS</title>
<subtitle/>
<track>Workshop</track>
<type/>
<language/>
<abstract>This workshop is a discovery of Suricata though SELKS a distribution dedicated to this open source threat detection engine. Through hands-on exercises done in a virtual environment, the attendees will discover the network security monitoring and intrusion detection capabilities of Suricata. They will also write their first signatures to see how it is possible to use Suricata to detect specific threats.

Requirements: a laptop with 8GB of RAM. 
</abstract>
<description/>
<logo>https://2018.pass-the-salt.org/img/salt-512.png</logo>
<persons>
<person>Éric Leblond (Suricata core developer, Stamus Networks)</person>
</persons>
<links>
</links>
<attachments>
</attachments>
</event>

</room>
</day>


</schedule>